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The theory of endogenous technical change has deeply contributed to our understanding of 
the fundamental sources of economic growth and development. In this chapter we survey 
important contributions in the field by focussing on the basic structure of endogenous growth 
models with horizontal as well as vertical innovation and emphasizing important implications 
for growth policy. We address issues like the scale effect problem, directed technological 
change to understand the evolution of wage inequality, long-run divergence between the 
innovating North and the imitating South due to inappropriate technology in the South, the 
relationship between trade and growth, competition and R&D, and the role of imperfect 
capital markets for R&D-based growth. 
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This chapter is prepared for the UNESCO EOLSS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES / Mathematical Models in Economics. 1 Introduction
Sustained and signiﬁcant growth in average world per capita income started roughly with
the ﬁrst era of the industrial revolution (Jones, 2005, section 5). There is little doubt
that technological progress through process innovations played the key role in initiating,
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Figure 1: U.S. per capita GDP (log scale), 1870-2001. Note: Data from Maddison (2003).
Even according to neoclassical growth theory, long-run growth in income and physical
capital per worker is entirely driven by productivity growth (more precisely, by the rate of
labor-saving technological progress). Unfortunately, however, neoclassical growth models
treat this growth rate as exogenous. They focus on transitional dynamics where the
prime engine of income growth per worker is capital accumulation, depending on rates of
i n v e s t m e n ta n dp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hi na d d i t i o nt ot h ep r o d u c t i v i t yg r o w t hr a t e .T h e r e b y ,
neoclassical growth theory predicts falling growth rates within countries over time and
convergence between countries, conditional on economic fundamentals. However, as
1shown in Fig. 1, historical evidence points to a relative stability of growth rates for
more than a century in the U.S. Moreover, there is long-run divergence in per capita
income between major regions in the world.1 Fig. 2 illustrates that economic divergence
is not a recent phenomenon but started roughly with the beginning of the modern era,
characterized by relatively fast growth in Western countries and slow growth in Africa
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Figure 2: Divergence in per capita income, 1820-2001. Note: Data from Maddison
(2003).
From this brief discussion, it is evident that models which endogenize technological
change are highly desirable to understand the process of economic development in the
long-run. In this survey, we outline in some detail important theoretical approaches in
1By allowing for accumulation of human capital in the basic model of Solow (1956), Mankiw, Romer
and Weil (1992) argue that, using data from the period 1960-85, about 80 percent of the cross-country
variation in income can be explained by focusing on the steady state of the augmented Solow-model,
through diﬀerences in investment rates and the population growth rate. However, they do not address
the overwhelming evidence on long-run divergence. Moreover, Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2001) ﬁnd
that, inconsistent with the Solow-model, the long-run growth rate depends on behavioral variables,
particularly on the rate of investment of physical capital.
2which technological progress is driven by deliberate R&D investments of private agents
in response to market incentives. This literature, starting with Romer (1990), rests on
the basic premise that intentional innovations require resources spent prior to both pro-
duction of goods and product market competition. It thereby abandons the neoclassical
paradigm of perfect competition and constant-returns to scale in the production process,
which (as we point out in more detail in section 2) runs into the fundamental problem
that it leaves no resources for the private sector to ﬁnance the search for innovations.
The second premise of endogenous growth theory is that technological knowledge, in the
form of a set of instructions how to produce goods and services (called “idea”, “blue-
print” or “design” in the literature), is a non-rival good; that is, an innovation can be
used by others without diminishing the knowledge of the innovator. This implies that,
without ways to exclude others from (some of) the newly created knowledge, in a large
society no agent would have an incentive to incur any costs to innovate. (At least this
is true when potential innovators are motivated alone by material beneﬁts which ac-
crue from applying the innovation.) An innovation would then be a pure public good,
which suﬀers from underprovision when privately supplied (with zero provision when
t h en u m b e ro fa g e n t sg o e st oi n ﬁnity). Intellectual property rights protection, which
emerged in Britain already in the seventeenth century, may thus play an important role
for stimulating innovations.2
In sum, endogenous growth theory captures the notion that knowledge accumulates
through the arrival of new ideas which are an outcome of proﬁt-oriented R&D invest-
ments. By outlining basic approaches of this theory we demonstrate that it generates a
wide range of interesting hypotheses and policy implications.
Our survey is structured into three main parts. In section 2, we present models
2The historical role of patents for the growth process is still under debate, however. For instance,
Khan and Sokoloﬀ (2001) show that the open patent system in the U.S. stimulated research activity in
the nineteenth century. In contrast, Mokyr (2005) argues that the patent system in Britain did not play
a major role in advancing technological knowledge during the ﬁrst industrial revolution. Rather, non-
material beneﬁts like honor and prestige to individual innovators provided important R&D incentives.
Moreover, accumulation of knowledge often rested on small and continuous technological improvements
within ﬁrms created by skilled engineers who found productivity-enhancing ways to apply major inven-
tions like the steam engine. As it may not be possible to immediately imitate such improvements, there
are incentives to innovate even in absence of intellectual property rights.
3where growth is driven by new intermediate inputs (“horizontal innovations”), capturing
specialization gains. The section builds on the seminal paper by Romer (1990). One
major issue which has arisen from early models of endogenous technical change is the
prediction of “scale eﬀects” in growth rates, meaning that economies which possess a
larger workforce that is capable to conduct R&D have higher per capita income growth
rates. However, this result is inconsistent with the evidence that the U.S. economy is
characterized by a fairly balanced (at least clearly non-accelerating) long-run growth
path (recall Fig. 1) despite large increases in the number of employed scientists and
engineers during the second half of the twentieth century (Jones, 1995a,b, 2005). We
discuss how Jones (1995a,b) eliminates the prediction of scale eﬀects in growth rates. In
his so-called semi-endogenous growth model, positive long-run growth is possible only
if there is positive population growth. We then turn to three applications of the basic
framework with horizontal innovations. First, following Acemoglu (1998, 2002), we allow
for technological change which is directed to various skill types, thereby addressing the
widely-discussed evidence on rising skill premia in many developed countries, despite
increasing relative supply of skilled labor, in the last few decades. Second, we present
a two-economy (“North” and “South”) model, where economies diﬀer in their relative
endowment of skilled labor. We show that, although the South can imitate the technology
of the innovating North at a small cost, output per worker is larger in the North, due
to diﬀerent factor endowments (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001). Third, we highlight the
role of horizontal innovations for the impact of liberalization of goods trade on economic
growth (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). In section 3, we turn to models of “vertical
innovations”, where growth is driven by quality-improvements of intermediate goods. We
ﬁrst present a version of the “creative destruction” model by Aghion and Howitt (1992).
As many models of endogenous technical change, in addition to scale eﬀects in growth
rates, the model predicts that higher market power is unambiguously conducive to R&D
expenditure. As the scale eﬀects prediction, this result is refuted by empirical evidence
(e.g. Blundell, Griﬃth and van Reenen, 1999; Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and
Howitt, 2005, Aghion, Blundell, Griﬃth, Howitt and Prantl, 2006). Following Aghion
and Howitt (2005), we therefore present a model with vertical innovations which modiﬁes
4this result and has interesting implications for industrial R&D policy. In section 4, we
allow for horizontal diﬀerentiation in a model of vertical innovations, like in Dinopoulos
and Thompson (1998), Peretto (1998), Segerstrom (1998), Young (1998).3 This class of
models eliminates the scale eﬀect in growth rates like semi-endogenous growth models
b u ta tt h es a m et i m ea l l o w sf o rp o s i t i v ei n c o m eg r o w t he v e ni na b s e n c eo fp o p u l a t i o n
growth. Finally, we introduce borrowing constraints for ﬁnancing R&D into this model.
The resulting model suggests an important role of credit market imperfections for long-
run divergence, as recently emphasized by Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
2 Horizontal Innovation
The models considered in this section explain economic development to result from the
interplay between capital accumulation and endogenous technological change. Private
ﬁrms engage in R&D which results in new varieties of intermediate (or capital) goods.4
Since new intermediate goods are of the same quality as previously invented goods,
technological change here takes the form of horizontal innovations.
2.1 The Romer model
2.1.1 The challenge of modelling technological change
The neoclassical growth model relies on exogenous technological progress as the ultimate
engine of long-run economic growth (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956). Romer (1990) was the
ﬁrst who formulated an explicit and rigorous growth model with endogenous technical
progress. His analysis is based on three premises: (i) economic growth is driven by
technological progress as well as capital accumulation; (ii) technological progress results
from deliberate actions taken by private agents who respond to market incentives; (iii)
technological knowledge is a non-rivalrous input. We will see below how these premises
are formalized within the model.
3For simplicity, we focus on a discrete time version of this class of models, as in Young (1998).
4In the Grossman-Helpman (1991, chapter 3) model, not considered here, technological change takes
t h ef o r mo fn e wv a r i e t i e so fc o n s u m e rg o o d s .
5Formulating a general equilibrium model with endogenous technological change, as
required by premise (ii) above, is all but trivial.5 The major theoretical diﬃculty can be
sketched as follows. Consider an economy producing a ﬁnal output good Y according to
the production technology Y = F(A,K,L),w h e r eA denotes the state of technology, K
the stock of physical capital, L labor input, and F(.) is C2 with
∂F(.)
∂X > 0 and
∂2F(.)
∂X2 < 0
for all X ∈ {A,K,L}. It is further assumed that F(.) exhibits constant returns to
scale (CRS) in capital and labor, i.e. λY = F(A,λK,λL) for any λ ≥ 0. Neoclassical
theory relies on perfect competition such that all factors are rewarded according to
their marginal product. This in turn implies that output is completely exhausted, i.e.
Y = FK(.)K + FL(.)L with FK(.): =
∂F(.)
∂K denoting the marginal product of capital etc.
Now it becomes obvious that any theory which rests on perfect competition together
with CRS and should fulﬁll premise (ii) runs into a fundamental problem. Those agents
who bring technical change about are assumed to react to market incentives and must
therefore be rewarded somehow. Since output is, however, completely used up by paying
wages to labor and rental prices to capital owners, nothing is left to reward researchers.
2.1.2 The structure of the model
We consider a simpliﬁed version of the Romer (1990) model in that there is only one
type of labor.6 The household side is identical to the Ramsey model of optimal growth
(see, for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, chapter 2). On the production side
there are three sectors: a ﬁnal output sector, a producer durables sector, and a research
sector.
Households. The economy is populated by a continuum of mass one identical
households. Each household is endowed with L units of labor services per unit of time,
which are inelastically supplied (independent of the wage rate) to the market. Households
are assumed to choose the time path of consumption C(t) so as to maximize the present




1−σ e−ρtdt,w h e r eσ>0 and ρ>0 is
5Earlier contributions modelled technical progress as a by-product of capital accumulation (Arrow,
1962; Romer, 1986).
6Romer (1990) distinguishes between unskilled labor and skilled labor (human capital). This dis-
tinction is, however, not essential for the derived results; it merely relabels the relevant scale variable,
as explained below.








where ˙ C(t): =dC(t)/dt denotes the rate of change of consumption and r(t) is the interest
rate in t.
Final output sector. Firms in the ﬁnal output sector produce a homogenous good
Y that can be either consumed or used as an input in the production of diﬀerentiated
capital goods. The market for the ﬁnal output good is perfectly competitive. The








where LY is the amount of labor devoted to Y -production, x(i) is the amount of capital
good i ∈ [0,A],a n d0 <α<1. In equilibrium x(i)=x for all i and hence the above
technology can be expressed as Y = L
1−α
Y Axα.M o r e o v e r ,i fw ed e ﬁne aggregate capital




This formulation shows that equ. (2) boils down to a Cobb-Douglas technology with
labor-augmenting technical change and hence makes an important implication obvious:
Even if one holds the total amount of capital K = Ax constant, an increase in the
"number" of varieties A boosts the productivity of labor. Hence, technology (2) captures
the basic idea that specialization, as reﬂected by an increasing number of intermediate
goods x(i), makes the production process more and more eﬃcient (Smith, 1776, Book I,
chapter I; Ethier, 1982; Solow, 2000, chapter 9). Final output is chosen as the numeraire,
its price is set equal to unity pY =1 .
Producer durables sector. Producers in this sector manufacture diﬀerentiated
capital goods x(i), also labelled "producer durables" or simply "machines". As a techni-
cal and legal prerequisite for production, ﬁrms must at ﬁrst purchase a blueprint (design).
Technology (2) implies that the x(i) are imperfect substitutes in Y -production; this as-
7T h et i m ei n d e xt is often supressed to simplify the notation.
7sumption is crucial for monopolistic competition in the market for producer durables.8
As regards the production technology for x(i),i ti sa s s u m e dt h a ti tt a k e so n eu n i to f
"raw capital" (output not consumed) to create one unit of any type of durables (Romer,
1990, p. S82).9 The constant marginal production cost of x therefore equals the interest
rate r. As regards the institutional structure, it is assumed that x-producers rent their
machines to Y -producers by charging a rental price.
R&D sector. Firms in the research sector search for new and economically valuable
ideas. An "idea" is a blueprint (design) for a new producer durable. The market for
designs is perfectly competitive and characterized by free entry.10 R&D is modelled as
a deterministic process. The R&D technology is given by
˙ A = ηALA,( 4 )
where ˙ A := dA/dt denotes the rate of change in the number of blueprints A per period
of time dt, LA the amount of labor devoted to R&D, and η>0. N o t i c et h a tt h e
productivity of researchers LA increases with technological knowledge A; see premise
(iii) above.11
It should be noted that there is a double knife-edge restriction implicit in this for-
mulation: (i) ∂ ln ˙ A
∂ lnA =1and (ii) ∂ ln ˙ A
∂ lnLA =1 .T h e ﬁrst is needed for sustained growth
to be feasible.12 The second is required for a consistent microeconomic structure, i.e.
a perfectly competitive market requires CRS in the single private input LA.I t i s f u r -
ther assumed that, once a new idea is found, its producer obtains perfect and perpetual
patent protection.
Equilibrium in the labor market requires L = LA + LY. Equilibrium in the capital
market requires that the household’s ﬁnancial capital equals the total physical capital
8The elasticity of substitution between any two x(i) is 1 < 1
1−α < ∞.
9This modelling assumption is further explained in Rivera-Batitz and Romer (1991, p. 534): "This
does not mean that consumption goods are directly converted into capital goods. Rather, the inputs
needed to produce one unit of consumption are shifted from the production of consumption goods into
the production of capital goods."
10In the words of Romer (1990, p. S85) "anyone engaged in research can freely take advantage of the
entire existing stock of designs in doing research to produce new designs".
11Acemoglu (2002, p. 793) uses the phrase "current researchers ‘stand on the sholder of giants‘."
12For a critical discussion of this linearity assumption see Solow (2000, chapter 9).
8employed by ﬁnal output ﬁrms K.
The long run growth rate. The ﬁnal output technology (3) indicates that, along
the balanced growth path (BGP), this model is equivalent to a neoclassical growth model
with labor-augmenting technical progress. This implies that the following relations must
hold along the BGP: ˆ Y = ˆ K = ˆ C = ˆ A = g,w h e r e ˆ X := ˙ X/X for all X ∈ {Y,K,C,A}.
Moreover, the R&D technology (4) implies that the long run growth rate of A is




A denotes the constant amount of labor devoted to R&D. The economically
interesting question then concerns the determination of L∗
A.T h i si st h ei s s u ew ec o n s i d e r
at next.
2.1.3 The decentralized solution
To determine the long run growth rate of the market economy we start with the equilib-
rium condition stating that the wage rate of labor employed in Y -production (wY)m u s t
equal the wage rate of labor employed in R&D (wR&D). The competitive wage rates in
both sectors equal the respective value marginal product of labor. From (2) and (4) one
therefore gets





where pA is the price of a blueprint. Operating proﬁts of the typical x-producer are
π =( pD(x) − r)x with pD(x) denoting the demand price (or inverse demand function)





The typical x-producer faces constant marginal cost, equal to r,a n dac o n s t a n t
elasticity demand curve with a price elasticity equal to 1
α−1 < −1.I t i s w e l l k n o w n
that, in this case, the optimal supply price is a mark-up over marginal cost according to
pS = r
α.M o r e o v e r ,u s i n gr = αpS we have π =( pD − αpS)x. From equilibrium in the
9x-market, pD = pS = p, and plugging (5) into the proﬁtf u n c t i o no n eg e t s




Assuming that the economy grows along a BGP, which implies that both π and r
are constant, the price of a blueprint may be expressed as pA = π
r. Hence, the price




r . Now evaluating the equilibrium










which immediately gives r = ηαLY. Plugging LY = L − LA (labor market equilibrium)
and LA =
g
η (from (4)) into the preceding equation leads to a condition describing
equilibrium on the supply side of the economy
r = ηαL− αg.( 6 )
The economic reason for the negative relationship between r and g is that an increase in
r lowers pA = π
r and therefore R&D ﬁrms employ a lower amount of labor. Equilibrium
o nt h ed e m a n ds i d ei sd e s c r i b e db yt h eK R R ,e q u .( 1 ) ,w h i c hm a yb ee x p r e s s e da s
r = σg + ρ.( 7 )
The positive association between r and g captures the fact that an increase in r motivates
households to save more which boost growth. Solving (6) and (7) for g yields g =
ηαL−ρ
σ+α .14
Since growth cannot become negative in this model, the long run growth rate of the
13This condition can be expressed as π
r = w
ηA and hence is equivalent to the free entry condition
(implying zero proﬁts) in the R&D sector. To see this, note that under (4), proﬁts are given by
PAηALA − wLA and use PA = π
r.
14One can equivalently solve (6) and (7) for r a n dt h e ne v a l u a t er = ηα(L − LA),w h i c hg i v e sL∗
A.
Plugging the result into g = ˆ A = ηAL∗
A yields, of course, the same solution.






σ+α for ηαL > ρ
0 for ηαL ≤ ρ
.( 8 )
Long run growth obviously requires that the economy is large enough in the sense that
ηαL > ρ. Moreover, the preceding solution shows a scale eﬀect since, provided that
ηαL > ρ, larger economies (with size being measured by L)d og r o wa tah i g h e rr a t e .
The economic reason for this scale eﬀect implication is that, along the BGP, a constant
fraction of the labor force is devoted to R&D. More researchers produce more knowl-
edge, which in turn improves the productivity of the R&D sector such that long run
growth accelerates. This eﬀect does, however, depend critically on the strength of the
intertemporal knowledge spill-over, as will be discussed below.
2.1.4 Market imperfections and policy implications
So far we have focused on the decentralized economy. Turning to the social planner’s







σ for ηL > ρ
0 for ηL ≤ ρ
.( 9 )
Comparing this result to (8) shows that gM <g S. The market economy grows at a
pace which is too low compared to the social optimum. This is due to two imperfections
inherent in the market economy, which bias the private allocation decisions (Jones and
Williams, 2000; Steger, 2005): First, the R&D technology (4) exhibits an intertempo-
ral knowledge spill-over since the productivity of current researcher LA increases with
the stock of knowledge, as measured by A, which has been accumulated in the past.
This social beneﬁti sn o tr e ﬂected in the market price for designs pA = π
r and, conse-
quently, R&D incentives are too low. Second, the typical producer durable ﬁrm realizes a
monopoly proﬁt by selling a diﬀerentiated capital good. It cannot, however, appropriate
the entire "consumer surplus". The gain to society resulting from a new innovation is
11larger than the private proﬁts earned by the monopolist. This static distortion leads
once more to a price of blueprints which falls short of its social value. Hence, the Romer
(1990) model unambiguously exhibits underinvestment in R&D.15 This basic implication
is in line with empirical studies on the gap between the private and the social rate of
return on R&D. Griliches (1991) reviews this literature and reports social rates of return
of about 40 to 60 percent, which are much higher than private rates of return.
What are appropriate public policies to correct these market failures? One possible
scheme of public policies is as follows. The positive knowledge spill-over can be neu-
tralized by a subsidy on the sales of blueprints. The "consumer surplus" eﬀect can be
corrected by subsidizing the sales of producer durables (Steger, 2005, section II).
2.2 Semi-endogenous R&D-based models
Jones (1995a,b, 2002) has argued that the scale eﬀect implication inherent in the ﬁrst
generation of R&D-based growth models (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991,
chapter 3; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) is empirically problematic. Using time series evi-
dence for the G5-group of industrialized economies he shows that the number of scientists
and engineers has risen drastically during the post-WWII period. Even the relation of
scientists and engineers to the total number of employees has increased in the G5-group
as a whole. During the same time period, however, the growth rate of GDP per capita
as well as the TFP growth rate was roughly stationary, or at least non-increasing, in the
U.S. (cf. Figure 1 above) and in the G5 group (see also Jones, 2005, section 5).16
This empirical pattern is clearly at odds with the basic R&D-based growth model
described above. Jones (1995a,b) has accordingly modiﬁed the Romer (1990) model to
eliminate the scale eﬀect. Another major result of this line of research is the ﬁnding of
15There are other R&D-based growth models with positive and negative R&D externalities such that
the amount of resources devoted to R&D might be too high in the market equilibrium (Jones and
Williams, 2000; Steger, 2005; Strulik, 2005). Also horizontal innovation models do not capture another
important externality associated with private R&D, namely the business stealing eﬀect (see Section 3
of this article).
16The evidence on the scale eﬀect is mixed, however. Kremer (1993) argues that there is a positive
scale eﬀect at the level of the world when considering the very long run (one million B.C. until present).
Backus et al. (1992) ﬁnd mixed results within a cross-sectional studies using diﬀerent measures for the
scale of an economy (e.g. aggregate GDP; manufacturing output; number of scientists, engineers and
technicians; R&D expenditure).
12policy ineﬀectiveness. Public policy is unable to control the long run growth rate. For
this reason Jones used the phrase "semi-endogenous growth model".
The Jones (1995a,b) model is basically identical to the Romer (1990) with one impor-
tant modiﬁcation. The double knife-edge restriction ∂ ln ˙ A
∂ lnA =1and ∂ ln ˙ A
∂ lnLA =1inherent
in the R&D technology, see (4) above, is relaxed by postulating the following (sectoral)
R&D technology
˙ A = ηA
φL
γ
A,( 1 0 )
where 0 <φ<1, 0 <γ≤ 1.17 The total amount of labor is assumed to grow exponen-
tially, i.e. L(t)=L0ent,w h e r en denotes the growth rate of the labor force, and L0 > 0.
As before, along a BGP we have ˆ y = ˆ k =ˆ c = ˆ A = g, where small letters denote per
capita quantities.
The determination of the long run growth rate is very simple in this model. Divide
both sides of equ. (10) by A, and use LA =
LA











Taking logarithms on both sides yields




Forming the time derivative and noting that (i) ˆ A = const.a n d
LA
L = const.a l o n ga
BGP by deﬁnition and (ii)
dLog(A)





The scale eﬀect has obviously been removed from the model. Instead, the growth rate
of per capita income g =ˆ y = ˆ A is now proportional to the growth rate of the labor force
n. Here we have an important implication for a number of industrialized economies
17Notice that γ<1 implies decreasing returns to labor at the sectoral level. This formulation is
compatible with CRS at the level of the ﬁrm and hence with perfect competition in the R&D sector
in the presence of negative duplication externalities (i.e. the possibility that decentralized R&D might
lead to redundancy).
13which experience a decline in n. Growth is semi-endogenous: On the one hand, it is
endogenous because growth still results from deliberate actions taken by private agents
who respond to market incentives. On the other hand, it is exogenous to the extent that
public policy cannot control the balanced growth rate.18 In fact, the long run growth
rate is proportional to the growth rate of labor with the factor of proportionality
γ
1−φ
being determined by the characteristics of the R&D technology.19
Finally it should be noted that Eicher and Turnovsky (1999) have formulated a
more general semi-endogenous R&D-based growth model (which they label non-scale
growth model), showing that the long run growth rate is in general determined by the
characteristics of both the R&D technology and the ﬁnal output technology.
2.3 Directed technical change
The R&D-based endogenous growth models considered so far are characterized by a
single R&D process. There are, however, a number of important topics (like biased tech-
nological change and the evolution of wage inequality or the consequences of international
trade on the direction of technological change), which require a setup with multiple R&D
processes such that technological change can be directed at diﬀerent factors of produc-
tion. Hence, we next turn to a model with two sectors, two production factors and two
R&D processes to study the direction of technical change. This approach is due to Ace-
moglu (1998, 2002); see also Gancia and Zilibotti (2005). The model considered here is
a direct extension of the Romer (1990) model.
2.3.1 The basic model setup
Final output sector. There is a large number of mass one of identical ﬁrms who
produce a homogenous ﬁnal output Y under perfect competition using the following
18The long run growth rate of the market economy and the socially controlled economy coincide. In
this sense there is simply no need for public policy to intervene. Nonetheless, along the BGP, the market
economy grows at a lower level compared to the socially controlled economy.
19Neither do preferences nor the parameters of ﬁnal output technology play any role. These parameters
do nonetheless aﬀect the level of the BGP.













where YL and YH are intermediate inputs, 0 <γ<1 is a constant parameter, and
0 <ε<∞ determines the degree of substitution between YL and YH in Y -production
(as explained below). The ﬁnal output good can be used for consumption (C), as an
input in the production of machines (I), or as an input in R&D (R). The economy’s
resource constraint accordingly reads Y ≤ C + I + R.
Intermediate goods sector. There is a large number of mass one of identical YL-
producers and a large number of mass one of identical YH-producers. Production takes
place under perfect competition. The production technologies for the two intermediate












αdi,( 1 2 )
where L denotes unskilled labor, H skilled labor, and 0 <α<1 a constant parameter.
Notice that the production of YL is assumed to be labor intensive, whereas the production
of YH is human capital intensive. There are two type of producer durables ("machines"),
namely xL(i) with i ∈ [0,A L] and xH(i) with i ∈ [0,A H].M a c h i n e s o f t y p e xL(i)
are combined with labor in YL-production, whereas machines xH(i) are combined with
human capital in YH-production. This formulation captures the basic idea that diﬀerent
input factors (L and H) are combined with diﬀerent machines and, hence, technological
progress (the introduction of new machines) might favor one factor more than others.
For instance, the introduction of the assembly line primarily increased the productivity
of unskilled labor, whereas the introduction of computers favored human capital.
As before, technical change enhances the spectrum of available machines. The im-
portant point to notice is that the range of machines that can be used with labor is AL,
whereas the range of machines that can be used with human capital is AH. Therefore,
15in this setup, technical change is either directed at labor (i.e. increasing AL) or directed
at human capital (i.e. enhancing AH).
Machines sector. Firms in this sector conduct R&D and once a ﬁrm has found
a blueprint for a new machine it starts production and marketing. There is a large
number of potential suppliers and free entry into this sector. Once a design for a new
machine is found, the successful ﬁrm is granted perfect and inﬁnite patent protection
and thereby becomes a "technology monopolist". The market for machines hence is
monopolistically competitive. Machines (xL and xH) are rented to intermediate goods
producers by charging a rental price (pxL, pxH). For simplicity, it is assumed that all
machines depreciate fully after use.20 The marginal production cost is the same for all
machines and equal to ψ in terms of the ﬁnal good. The R&D technologies are given by
˙ AL = ηLRL
˙ AH = ηHRH,
where ηL,η H > 0 and RL is spending on R&D (in terms of ﬁnal output) for new xL-
machines and RH is spending on R&D for xH-machines. This speciﬁcation, labelled as
lab-equipment approach, departs from the original Romer model in that ﬁnal output is
used instead of labor as an input in R&D.
2.3.2 Equilibrium
The typical Y -producer takes the output price pY and input prices (pL and pH)a sg i v e n .











,( 1 3 )
i.e. the ratio of input prices (LHS of (13)) must equal the marginal rate of substitution
(RHS of (13)). Here one recognizes that the elasticity of substitution between YH and
20Hence, the machines xL(i) and xH(i) are similar to intermediate goods which are used up in the
















1−ε =1 .( 1 4 )
The producers of intermediate goods (YL and YH)m a x i m i z ep r o ﬁts








taking output prices (pL and pH) and input prices ( pxL, pxH,w L,wH)a sg i v e n .N o t i n g
















H,( 1 6 )
where pD
xL(i) and pD
xH(i) denote demand prices. Intermediate goods producer accordingly
rent more machines, the higher product prices (pL and pH), the larger the amount of
complementary factors employed (L and H) and the lower the rental price of machines
(pD
xL, pD
xH). Operating proﬁts of the typical technology monopolists are given by
πL =( p
S



























H H,( 1 8 )
where the second equalities follow from the demand curves (15) and (16), noting that the











xL (equilibrium in the machine markets). The relative
21See Solow (2000, chapter 10) on the determination and interpretation of the CES price index in the
Dixit-Stiglitz framework.











.( 1 9 )
The incentive to engage in AH-expanding R&D relative to the incentive to conduct
AL-enhancing R&D comprises two components. The ﬁrst term gives the price eﬀect:
there is a greater incentive to develop technologies producing more expensive goods.
The second term is the market size eﬀect: the incentive to develop a new technology is
proportional to the number of workers that will be using it.
We now turn to the ratio of AH and AL along the BGP. For AH/AL to be constant,
as required for balanced growth, there must be innovating ﬁr m si nb o t hm a c h i n es e c t o r s .
This requires that it is equally proﬁtable to invest in AH-expanding and AL-expanding
R&D, i.e. ηHπH = ηLπL. From this condition the constant ratio of technologies can be














,( 2 0 )
where θ := 1+(ε−1)(1−α) is the (derived) elasticity of substitution between H and L
(as will become clear below).22 As long as human capital and labor are strong substitutes
(θ>1), an increase in the supply of one factor will induce more innovation directed to
that speciﬁc factor. The reason is that, as long as θ>1, the market size eﬀect dominates
the price eﬀect. As a consequence, technological change is biased towards the abundant
factor. The reverse holds true for θ<1. In this case, the price eﬀect dominates the
market size eﬀect and technological change favors the scarce factor.
By determining the equilibrium interest rate from the condition that proﬁts in the
machines sector equal zero and plugging the result into the KRR, the long run growth




(r − ρ) (21)
22Notice that θ>(<)1 requires ε>(<)1.


















. As usual, long run growth decreases with the time pref-
erence rate ρ. It increases with the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1
σ and the
interest rate r. The interesting point to notice here is that the interest rate (hence the
growth rate) is determined by the characteristics of all production technologies (ﬁnal
output, machines, and R&D) as well as by factor endowments (H and L).23
To see the implications of directed technological change for factor prices, one can solve

















.( 2 3 )
This relation shows that the (short run) elasticity of substitution between H and L
is
∂ ln(H/L)
∂ ln(wH/wL) = −θ. The relative factor reward is decreasing in the relative factor supply.
This is due to the usual substitution eﬀect. Moreover, when θ>1 a greater skill bias in
technology AH/AL increases relative factor rewards and vice versa.
We ﬁnally look at the implications for relative factor prices in the long run, i.e. when
technology is considered as being endogenous. Inserting (20) into (23) gives a reduced














.( 2 4 )
This equation shows that, as long as θ>2,a ni n c r e a s ei nr e l a t i v es u p p l yo fs k i l l e d
labor can go hand in hand with an increase in the skill premium (
wH
wL). This is due
to endogenous biased technological change towards the more abundant factor since the
market size eﬀect is suﬃciently strong. Hence, as argued by Acemoglu (1998), this
model provides a potential explanation for the empirical observation of a rise in the skill
premium in the U.S. during the period 1960-90 despite an increase in the relative supply
of skilled labor.24
23Hence this model also features a scale eﬀect.
24For a comprehensive discussion of "technical change and labor market inequalities" see Hornstein,
192.4 Appropriate technology and development
The previous section has demonstrated that the directed-technical-change approach can
be used to understand the evolution of wage inequality within an economy. This ap-
proach can also be employed to understand the fundamental causes of the sustained
income gap between industrialized and less developed countries.25 An important reason
for sustained underdevelopment is due to "inappropriate technologies". The model de-
veloped by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) assumes that, quite realistically, less developed
economies imitate the technologies developed in industrialized countries. Provided that
intellectual property rights cannot be enforced in underdeveloped economies, technolo-
gies are designed according to the fundamentals of the rich industrialized countries and
therefore are not optimal when applied in poor underdeveloped economies.
2.4.1 The basic model setup
There are two sets of economies, the North and the South. The North is innovative, as
in the previous sections. The South does not innovate but adopts technologies innovated
in the North. Intellectual property rights cannot be enforced in the South. There is no
trade between the North and the South. The model is similar to the directed technical
change model. There are three sectors, namely a ﬁnal output sector, an intermediate
goods sector, and a machines sector.
Final output sector. This sector is perfectly competitive. Firms assemble a range
of intermediate goods y(i) with i ∈ [0,1] to produce ﬁnal output Y according to





.( 2 5 )
This somewhat unusual production function can be viewed as a symmetric Cobb-Douglas
function. Final output can be used for consumption (C), investment (I), or as an input
in R&D (X). The resource constraint therefore is Y ≤ C+I+X.M o r e o v e r ,ﬁnal output
good is chosen as the numeraire good such that pY =1 .
Krusell and Violante (2005).
25Caselli (2005) reviews the development accounting literature, which aims at explaining the empirical
causes for international diﬀerences in per capita incomes.
20Intermediate goods sector. There is a continuum of heterogenous sectors produc-
ing intermediate goods y(i). Each intermediate good y(i) c a nb ep r o d u c e dw i t hu n s k i l l e d
labor l,s k i l l e dl a b o rh, and machines. However, each sector has a diﬀerent production
technology. The key assumption is that some machines can only be used with unskilled
labor, while some other machines can only be used with skilled labor. More speciﬁcally,
the production technology for good y(i) is of the following form












H(i,ν)dν,( 2 6 )
where l(i) and h(i) are the quantities of unskilled and skilled labor employed in sector
i, xL(i,γ) is the quantity of xL-machines of type γ ∈ [0,A L] employed in sector i,a n d
xH(i,ν) is the quantity of xH-machines of type ν ∈ [0,A H] in sector i, respectively. Notice
the term (1−i), associated with unskilled labor l(i),a n dt h et e r mi, attached to skilled
labor h(i), which denote exogenous technology-speciﬁc and sector-speciﬁc productivities.
In sectors with a high i ∈ [0,1] unskilled labor (which can only be combined with xL-
machines) has a low productivity but skilled labor (which can only be combined with
xH-machines) has a high productivity, and vice versa.
Machines sector. Firms in this sector either innovate (in the North) or imitate
(in the South). Successful innovators in the North are granted perfect patent protection
in the Northern market. Once a blueprint has been invented or copied, ﬁrms start to
manufacture and market diﬀerentiated machines as technology monopolists. There is a
large number of potential entrants and there is free entry. For reasons which become
clear below, the unit production cost are normalized to α2.
2.4.2 Equilibrium
The North. Each ﬁrm in the intermediate goods sector maximizes proﬁts taking the
output price p(i) and input prices (wL, wH, pxL, pxH) as given. The resulting sectoral
demand curves for xL-machines and xH-machines are as follows (due to symmetry the


















.( 2 8 )
Since marginal cost of machine production are equal to α2, the optimal supply price
is pS
xL = pS
xH = α.S e t t i n gpD
xL = pS
xL = α and pD
xH = pS
xH = α in (27) and (28) and using
(26) yields an indirect production function for intermediate goods
y(i)=p(i)
α
1−α [AL(1 − i)l(i)+AHih(i)].( 2 9 )
This formulation shows very clearly that, given AL and AH, the productivity of
unskilled labor decreases with the sector index i, whereas the productivity of skilled
labor increases with the sector index. This implies that there is a critical threshold
J ∈ [0,1] such that all sectors i ≤ J will employ unskilled labor only (together with
xL-machines), whereas all sectors i>Jwill employ skilled labor only (together with
xH-machines).




0 xL(i)di;f o rxH-monopolist we have πH =( pS
xH − α2)
R 1
0 xH(i)di. Noting (27)
and (28) together with pD
xL = pS
xL = α and pD
xH = pS
xH = α equilibrium proﬁts read as
follows





1−α(1 − i)l(i)di (30)





1−αih(i)di.( 3 1 )
T h ep r i c e so fi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d sa r eg i v e nb y( s e et h ea p p e n d i xf o rd e t a i l s )
p(i)=p(0)(1 − i)
−(1−α) ∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ J (32)
p(i)=p(1)i
−(1−α) ∀ J<i≤ 1 (33)
22where p(0) is the price of y(0) and p(1) is the price of y(1). The economic intuition behind
these price equations is straightforward. Consider the price of intermediate goods, which
a r ep r o d u c e dw i t hu n s k i l l e dl a b o r ,a sg i v e nb y( 3 2 ) .A si ∈ [0,J] increases, intermediate
goods y(i) become more expensive since the productivity of unskilled labor l(i) falls with
i. An analogous interpretation applies to p(i) with i ∈ [J,1], as given by (33).
As has been indicated above, the pattern of sectoral productivities of skilled and
unskilled labor implies that there are two groups of sectors in equilibrium. The ﬁrst
group produces with unskilled labor and xL-machines, whereas the second employs skilled
l a b o rt o g e t h e rw i t hxH-machines. The critical threshold J can be determined from the
condition p(0)(1−J)−(1−α) = p(1)J−(1−α) stating that both sectors are equally proﬁtable










.( 3 4 )
Remember that the range of sectors employing unskilled labor is [0,J]. This range is
accordingly smaller, the higher the skill bias of technology
AH
AL and the larger the relative
human capital endowment H
L. The reverse holds true for the range of sectors producing
with unskilled labor, as given by [J,1].
It can be shown that aggregate output, deﬁned by Y =
R 1
0 p(i)y(i)di, is described
by a CES technology in the primary input factors L and H (for the derivation see the
appendix):






.( 3 5 )
Notice that the (derived) elasticity of substitution between L and H in Y -production is
equal to 2.
To complete the description of the macroeconomic equilibrium, we ﬁnally report the
skill bias. In the appendix it is shown that along the BGP the skill bias in the North,






.( 3 6 )
23This equation shows that the technological skill bias
AH
AL is positively associated with the
relative skill endowment
HN
LN . This is in fact a special case of the preceding result; see
equ. (20), assuming that θ =2 . Combining (34) and (36), we ﬁnd that the threshold







The South. The Southern economies are largely identical to the Northern economies.
There are, however, two important exceptions. First, intellectual property rights cannot
be enforced in the South and hence there is no R&D in the South. Machine producers
in the South can copy the blueprints invented in the North at a small ﬁxed cost. As
a result, the South operates with the range of machines as provided by the North,




LN . From (34) and (36), this implies that the threshold sector in the South











T h em o d e ls e tu pa b o v ei m p l i e st h a to u t p u tp e rw o r k e r( Y
L+H) in the typical Southern
economy is smaller than output per worker in the typical Northern economy. This re-
sult holds true despite the fact that both group of economies have access to the same
technology. The economic intuition is straightforward: Southern economies use a tech-
nology mix, as given by [0,A L] and [0,A H], which has been designed according to the
fundamentals of the North, but is suboptimal when applied in the South.
To illustrate the implied productivity diﬀerences consider output per worker, which
can be expressed as follows (see equ. (35))
Y
L + H











Figure 3 shows that output per worker is an inverse U-shaped function of H
L.M o r e -
over, it is easy to show that this curve has a maximum at H
L =
AH
AL. Considering equ. (36)
shows that this condition holds true for Northern economies. Hence, the technology mix
AH
AL is such that labor productivity is indeed maximized in the North. Since Southern
24economies have a lower relative skill endowment, output per worker in the South falls
short of output per worker in the North.
Figure 3: Output per worker as a function of relative human capital.
The reason for the productivity diﬀerence between the North and the South is a
technology-skill mismatch. The North develops technologies that are most appropriate
for its own needs. More speciﬁcally, the North develops more skill-biased technologies be-
cause there are relatively more skilled workers using these technologies. These Northern
technologies are mismatched to the skills of the workforce in less developed economies.
This can be seen more clearly from (36), which implies AH(1−JN)=ALJN. Considering
the production function (29) immediately shows that the preceding condition states that
the physical productivities of both skilled and unskilled labor are equalized. This basic
eﬃciency condition is violated in the South since AH and AL are the same, but JS >J N.
2.5 Trade and growth
So far we have used horizontal innovation models to better understand economic devel-
opment in isolated economies. It is clear that, in the real world, there are a number
of international linkages (like goods trade, capital movements, migration of labor, and
the ﬂow of ideas via communication networks), which might have important feedback ef-
fects on the process of economic growth. In what follows we focus on the consequences of
25goods trade and the ﬂow of ideas for economic growth. The analysis follows Rivera-Batiz
and Romer (1991).
2.5.1 The model setup
The underlying model is basically identical to the Romer (1990) model considered above.
Recall that there are three sectors on the production side. Final output is produced
according to technology (2). The production of machines requires that one unit of
consumption is foregone, implying that the unit cost equals r.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t ﬁnal
output (consumption) and machines are produced with the same technology.
Turning to the R&D sector, we distinguish between two diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The
ﬁrst model, labelled the knowledge-driven speciﬁcation of R&D, is the same as in the
underlying base model. The R&D technology is given by equ. (4), which is restated here
for convenience
˙ A = ηALA.( 3 7 )
T h ei m p o r t a n tp o i n tt on o t i c ei st h a tt e c h n o l o g i c a lk n o w l e d g e ,m e a s u r e db yA,h a sa
direct impact on the productivity of researchers. Since the manufacturing sector (pro-
ducing consumption goods and machines) and the R&D sector use diﬀerent technologies,
the underlying economy belongs to the class of two-sector models.
The second speciﬁcation, labelled the lab-equipment approach of R&D, assumes that
the R&D technology is proportional to the production function used in the manufacturing
sector






αdi,( 3 8 )
where B>0, 0 <α<1, LA denotes the amount of labor devoted to R&D, and xA(i) is
the amount of machines of type i employed in R&D. Notice that knowledge per se has
no direct impact on the productivity of researchers. In contrast to the knowledge-driven
speciﬁcation, the lab-equipment model belongs to the class of one-sector models. If the
output of manufacturing goods (C+ ˙ K) is reduced by one unit and the inputs released are
transferred to the R&D sector, they yield B additional designs.26 Hence, this technology
26In the knowledge-driven model the production possibility frontier (PPF) between manufacturing
26speciﬁcation ﬁx e st h ep r i c eo fd e s i g n sa tpA =1 /B. We will see that this has important
implications for the consequences of economic integration on long run growth.
2.5.2 The interest rate and the balanced growth rate
Before turning to the implications of economic integration, we determine the equilib-
rium interest rate and the balanced growth rate for the two model speciﬁcations under
consideration. For the knowledge-driven speciﬁcation we know from section 2.1.3 that
equilibrium on the production side requires r = ηαL− αg (see equ. (6)), whereas equi-
librium in the consumer sphere is characterized by r = σg + ρ (see equ. (7)). The
intersection of these two equilibrium conditions determines r and g,a si l l u s t r a t e di n
Figure 4 (a).
In the lab-equipment model, equilibrium in the consumer sphere is also described by
the KRR, r = σg+ρ. However, in contrast to the knowledge-driven model, equilibrium on





1−α.( 3 9 )
This interest rate is obviously independent of the growth rate, as is also illustrated in
Figure 4 (b). The economic reason behind this result is as follows: In the knowledge-
driven model, an increase in the interest rate reduces the price of designs pA = π
r.27 As
a result, R&D becomes less attractive and less labor is allocated to the R&D sector,
which slows down growth. In the lab-equipment model, on the other hand, an increase
in r does not aﬀect pA =1 /B. Put diﬀerently, in the lab-equipment model there is only
one interest rate which is compatible with production of both manufacturing goods and
designs.
The balanced growth rate under the knowledge-driven speciﬁcation and the lab-
output (C + ˙ K) and new designs ( ˙ A)i sc o n c a v ed u et od i ﬀerent factor intensities in the two sectors. In
the lab-equipment model the PPF is linear.
27Notice that an increase in r reduces pA via two channels: (i) it directly reduces pA due to discounting
and (ii) it indirectly decreases pA since an increase in r lowers the equilibrium sales of x and hence reduces
proﬁts π.






α2+(α−1)(1 − α)1−αL1−αB1−α − ρ
σ
.( 4 1 )
Notice that, in both cases, there is a scale eﬀect since economic growth accelerates with
t h es i z eo ft h el a b o rf o r c eL.
Let us shortly sketch the consequences of complete economic integration of two iden-
tical economies. The integrated economy is identical to the individual economies with
the exception that the labor endowment is 2L instead of L.F o rb o t hs p e c i ﬁcations the
curve describing equilibrium in the production sphere shifts up, as displayed in Figure
4. As a result, both the interest rate and the growth rate increase.
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Figure 4: Long run equlibrium under knowledge-driven R&D speciﬁcation and
lab-equipment speciﬁcation (solid curves: autarky; dashed curves: integration).
28We assume that the growth condition is strictly satisﬁed in both cases such that g>0.
282.5.3 Three thought experiments
We consider the consequences of partial integration (either liberalization of goods trade or
ﬂow of ideas) between two completely identical economies.29 First, using the knowledge-
driven speciﬁcation, we investigate the consequences of goods trade liberalization. Sec-
ond, employing the same setup, we analyze the eﬀects of additionally removing any
barriers to the ﬂow of information. Third, we use the lab-equipment approach to study
t h ec o n s e q u e n c e so fg o o d st r a d eo n l y .
Goods trade without ﬂow of ideas in the knowledge-driven economy. Con-
sidering the R&D technology (37) sho w st h a tt h el o n gr u ng r o w t hr a t eg = ηLA is exclu-
sively determined by the allocation of labor to R&D. Goods trade liberalization can only
have an impact on growth by aﬀecting the intersectoral labor allocation. To simplify, we
assume that both economies produce initially completely disjoint sets of machines. Then,
in response to trade liberalization, the number of machines available to the manufactur-
ing sector doubles. Considering the ﬁnal output technology Y = L
1−α
Y Axα shows that the
wage rate in Y −production under trade liberalization amounts to wY =( 1−α)L
−α
Y 2Axα
(the amount of x along the BGP remains constant). What about the wage rate of re-
searchers? Opening the economy to goods trade implies that the market for newly
designed good is twice as large as it was in the absence of trade. As a consequence,
the price of designs, everything else the same, doubles and the wage rate of researchers
accordingly is wR&D =2 pAηA.30 Since both wages increase by the same proportional
amount, the allocation of labor L = LY + LA is not aﬀected along the BGP and hence
the long run growth rate remains constant. In terms of Figure 4 (a), goods liberalization
does not aﬀect the position of the two curves.
In summary, goods trade liberalization leaves the long run growth rate unchanged.
It does, however, increase the level of the BGP due to larger gains of specialization since
the number of machine varieties employed in Y -production doubles.
29Considering two identical economies radically simpliﬁes the analysis. Along the BGP there cannot be
any intertemporal trade in consumption goods nor can there be any intratemporal trade in homogenous
consumption goods. The only trade which takes place is intratemporal trade in diﬀerentiated capital
goods.
30Notice that A refers to domestic knowledge only.
29Flows of information in the knowledge-driven model. We assume full protec-
tion of international property rights. It is further supposed that two identical economies,
which have already liberalized their goods trade, remove any barriers to the ﬂow of in-
formation. This implies that R&D in each country can make use of the total knowledge
stock A + A∗ =2 A (again we assume that both economies produce two completely dis-
joint sets of machines). From the R&D technology the long run growth rate increases
to g = η2LA, provided that LA would remain constant. However, since the transition
to a regime of full information ﬂows increases, for a given allocation of labor, the wage
rate earned in the R&D sector, while leaving the wage rate in manufacturing unchanged,
labor shifts towards R&D. This reallocation eﬀect further speeds up growth.
Removing any barriers to communication doubles the stock of knowledge and hence
has the same consequences on the long run growth rate of output and designs as doubling
η in the R&D technology (see equ. (37)). The curve describing equilibrium in the
production sphere accordingly shifts up. Figure 4 (a) shows that this increases both the
interest rate and the growth rate. It is been argued above that complete integration
aﬀects the growth rate by replacing L by 2L in (40). Hence, the abolition of any barriers
to information ﬂows, assuming that goods trade has been already liberalized, has the
same eﬀect on long run growth as complete integration.31
Goods trade in the lab-equipment model. Assume, ﬁnally, that two identical
economies liberalize their goods trade. As in the previous examples, opening the economy
to trade in goods (i.e. trade in machines) doubles the extent of the market and hence
doubles the proﬁts earned by the typical x-monopolist. Everything else the same, this
should also increase the price of patents pA. However, this price is ﬁxed by technology.
T h eo n l yw a yt h a tt h el a r g e rm a r k e tc a nb er e c o n c i l e dw i t haﬁxed pA is if the interest
rate increases.32 It is easy to show that the interest rate must increase by a factor 21−α to
keep pA constant (see the appendix for details). The resulting growth eﬀect accordingly
follows from substituting r in g =
r−ρ
σ by 21−αr. Hence, goods market integration alone
already exerts a growth eﬀect in the lab-equipment model.
31The diﬀerence between complete integration on the one hand and free goods trade together with
free ﬂow of ideas is that migration of people is not allowed.
32Recall that the patent price can be sketched as pA = π
r.
30I na d d i t i o n ,i ti sr e a d i l ys h o w nt h a tg oo d sm a r k e ti n t e g r a t i o ni se q u i v a l e n tt oc o m p l e t e
integration. Inspecting (39) reveals that complete economic integration increases r by a
factor of 21−α; to see this replace L by 2L in (39). This says that, in the lab-equipment
model, trade liberalization has the same growth eﬀect as complete economic integration.
2.5.4 Final remarks
This section has demonstrated that international linkages can play an important role in
the process of economic development. The main insight reads that economic integration
may boost long run growth rate via two main channels: (i) the scale-eﬀects channel and
(ii) the factor-reallocation channel.33 As has been demonstrated, the results depend
crucially on the model under study. Moreover, since the growth rate in the underlying
class of models is unambiguously too low compared to the social optimum, opening up
the economy is welfare improving.
In addition, it is important to stress that the previous analysis is based on the simpli-
fying assumption of identical economies such that there are no reasons for specialization.
Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapters 4 and 5) and Devereux and Lapham (1994) have
shown that specialization does occur provided that there are international asymmetries.
In this case, the economy which has a comparative disadvantage in the engine-of-growth
sector might experience a deceleration of growth. Market integration is nonetheless likely
to be welfare improving due to favorable terms-of-trade eﬀects.
3 Vertical Innovations
As emphasized so far, in models of horizontal innovations economic growth is driven by
new intermediate goods which generate specialization gains. In this section, we turn
our focus to vertical innovations, which are directed to quality-improvements of exist-
ing goods or improvements of production processes. We start, in section 3.1, with a
so-called Schumpeterian growth model which captures the notion of “creative destruc-
33If the underlying model belongs to the class of semi-endogenous growth models, then there is only
a weak scale eﬀect, i.e. a scale eﬀect in levels (Bretschger and Steger, 2004).
31tion”, i.e., that existing goods and ﬁrms are replaced by new ones of higher quality
(Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 1998). In addition to featuring scale eﬀects in growth rates,
like the models by Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), the ﬁrst model
presented in this section has another problematic prediction in common with earlier
models of endogenous technical change: it suggests that a higher intensity of product
market competition reduces the incentive to conduct R&D and thereby retards growth.
However, many empirical studies ﬁnd that, if anything, more competition fosters inno-
vation (Blundell, Griﬃth and van Reenen, 1999) or that the relationship between the
intensity of product market competition and R&D investments is non-monotonic (e.g.
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and Howitt, 2005, Aghion, Blundell, Griﬃth, Howitt
and Prantl, 2006). Later, in section 3.2, we discuss a model, based on Aghion and Howitt
(2005, section 4), which is consistent with such evidence. It implies that in technologi-
cally advanced sectors incumbents have higher R&D incentives when they face a more
competitive environment, whereas the opposite occurs in less advanced sectors.
3.1 The Aghion-Howitt model
We start with a version of the endogenous growth model by Aghion and Howitt (1992,
1998) which captures the Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction. Higher R&D
investments raise the probability of innovations which are targeted to improve the quality
of an intermediate good, replacing the current version of the intermediate input in ﬁnal
goods production. The current intermediate good producer has price setting power,
for instance, due to a patent. However, when a new innovation arrives, the previous
innovation becomes worthless for the previous innovator (business-stealing eﬀect), even
if there is a patent of inﬁnite length. Like in Romer (1990), the expected proﬁts t r e a m
from an innovation determines the incentive of the R&D sector to incur R&D costs.
3.1.1 Set up
Consider a small open economy which faces interest rate r ≥ 0 and where instantaneous
utility of individuals is linear, with future consumption being discounted at rate (1 +
32r)−1. That is, individuals are risk-neutral and are indiﬀerent between present and future
consumption. There are H skilled workers and L =1unskilled workers. Both skilled and
unskilled workers inelastically supply one unit of labor to perfect labor markets which
are segmented by skill. Skilled workers can be allocated to both the R&D sector and the
intermediate goods sector, whereas unskilled workers can be employed in the ﬁnal goods
sector.34
The ﬁnal goods sector produces a homogenous good, chosen as numeraire. It operates
under perfect competition. Output yt after t innovations of the representative ﬁnal goods




1−α, 0 <α<1, (42)
where xt and At denote quantity and quality of the intermediate good after t innovations.
(Note that t is not an index of calendar time but indicates the number of innovations
w h i c hh a v eo c c u r r e ds of a r . )E a c hi n n o v a t i o nr a i s e st h eq u a l i t yo ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d
by a constant factor:
At+1 = γAt, γ>1,( 4 3 )
where A0 is given.
After each innovation, there is an intermediate good producer (e.g. the innovator
holding a patent) who can transform one unit of skilled labor into one unit of output.
Marginal production costs of innovator t thus equal the wage rate for skilled labor,
wt. A c c o r d i n gt o( 4 2 )a n dL =1 , innovator t faces an inverse demand function pt =
αAtx
α−1
t . Hence, as a monopolist, maximizing (pt−wt)xt subject to pt = αAtx
α−1
t , he/she
would charge the price pt = wt/α to the ﬁnal goods producer. However, assume that
there are many potential competitors (“competitive fringe”), which can also produce
t h em o s tr e c e n tv e r s i o no ft h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o db u ta r el e s sc o s t - e ﬃcient than the
innovator.35 For instance, one may think about foreign companies possessing a design for
an intermediate good which yields similar quality than that of the domestic intermediate
34By including unskilled labor in the model we extend the basic Aghion-Howitt framework in a way
which allows us to study eﬀects on the wage distribution; see section 3.1.3.
35T h i sa s s u m p t i o nh a sb e e ne m p l o y e di nd i ﬀerent contexts in a number of contributions on R&D and
growth (see e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 2005). It allows us to discuss in a simple way the role of product
market competition in the proposed framework.
33goods producer but are less accommodated to the local environment. Fringe ﬁrms require
χ ∈ (1,1/α) units of skilled labor per unit of output. As long as the price charged by
innovator t does not exceed χwt, he/she still gets the entire demand; thus, the optimal
price for the intermediate good producer with a one-to-one technology is pt = χwt,
i.e., χ is the mark-up factor, which inversely captures the intensity of product market
competition. Thus, in equilibrium, rivals do not enter. We may interpret a lower χ as
regulatory barrier to entry for foreign ﬁrms. Alternatively, it may reﬂect stricter price
regulation of monopoly ﬁrms.
Using demand function pt = αAtx
α−1
t ,p r i c ept = χwt implies that innovator t
produces output xt =[ α/(χωt)]
1
1−α,w h e r eωt ≡ wt/At. Hence, instantaneous proﬁt
πt =( pt − wt)xt of innovator t is given by





t ≡ At˜ π(ωt,χ). (44)
As ∂˜ π/∂χ > 0 for all χ<1/α,a ni n c r e a s ei nχ raises instantaneous proﬁts, whereas a
higher adjusted wage rate, ωt,n e g a t i v e l ya ﬀects πt.
The research sector is competitive. After t innovations, the probability for z inno-
vations to occur in a small time interval dτ is Poisson-distributed with parameter µtdτ,
i.e., is given by e
−µ
tdτ(µtdτ)z/z!. The probability that no innovations (z =0 )occur in dτ
after t+1innovations therefore equals e
−µ
t+1dτ. In this case, innovator t+1continues to
make proﬁt πt+1. Otherwise, he/she is replaced by the next innovator, which means that
proﬁts fall to zero. Parameter µt is proportional to the amount of R&D labor employed
after t innovations, ht, i.e., µt = λht,w h e r eλ>0 reﬂects the productivity of the R&D










Thus, an increase in the number of future researchers after t+1innovations have arrived,
ht+1, by raising the probability of innovation t+2, depresses the value of innovation t+1.
To determine the R&D input after t innovations, note that the probability per unit
36As will become apparent, the amount of R&D labor between two innovations is time-invariant.
34of time that a successful innovation t +1occurs, 1 − e−µt, is approximately given by














Labor market clearing requires ht + xt = H.T h u s ,u s i n gxt =[ α/(χωt)]
1








3.1.2 Steady state equilibrium R&D labor and growth
We focus on the steady state, where ht = h∗ and ωt = ω∗ (i.e., the allocation of skilled
labor does not change over time and its wage rate, w, grows in parallel with quality
index A). Combining (47) and (48) and observing the expression for ˜ π(ω,χ) in (44), we
obtain for the steady state R&D labor input
h
∗ =
γ(χ − 1)H − r/λ
1+γ(χ − 1)
. (49)
Before interpreting this result, note that expected output at time τ +1is E(y(τ +1))=
µtyt+1 +(1−µt)yt.A syt+1 = γyt and µt = λh∗ in steady state, the average growth rate
of output, gy = E(y(τ +1 ) ) /yt − 1, becomes
gy = λ(γ − 1)h
∗ (50)
in steady state. According to (49) and (50), we ﬁnd that the average steady state rate
of growth, gy, increases with skilled labor endowment H,m a r k - u pf a c t o rχ,a n dR & D
productivity λ.
35Figure 5: Comparative-static results in the creative-destruction model.
The comparative-static results in the creative destruction model can be understood
with help of the h − ω diagram in Fig. 5, which gives us the steady state amount of
R&D labor, h∗, as intersection between the curves (FOC) and (LMC). The curve (FOC)
shows a negative relationship between R&D labor, h, and the adjusted wage rate of
skilled labor, ω, implied by the ﬁrst-order condition (47) for the optimal R&D labor
choice. The curve (LMC) shows a positive relationship between h and ω,i m p l i e db yt h e
labor market clearing condition (48).
An increase in the size of the skilled workforce, H,a ﬀects the labor market clear-
ing condition. The (LMC)-curve in Fig. 5 shifts to the right, resulting in a lower
productivity-adjusted long-run equilibrium wage rate, ω∗, and a higher equilibrium
amount of R&D labor, h∗. A c c o r d i n gt o( 5 0 ) ,ah i g h e rh∗ implies a higher (average)
steady state growth rate, gy. Thus, like other ﬁrst-generation endogenous growth mod-
els, the model produces scale eﬀects in growth rates.
An increase in mark-up factor χ, which captures a lower intensity of product market
competition, aﬀects both ﬁr s t - o r d e rc o n d i t i o nf o rt h eo p t i m a lc h o i c eo fR & Dl a b o r( 4 7 )
36and labor market clearing condition (48). Regarding the consequences for h∗ both eﬀects
go in the same direction. First, a higher χ positively aﬀects instantaneous proﬁts and
thereby enhances the marginal beneﬁt to invest in R&D. This means that (FOC)-curve
in Fig. 5 shifts to the right. Second, it reduces labor input for the production of the
intermediate good for any given adjusted wage rate, ω. This is because a higher mark-up
reduces demand for the most recent version of the intermediate good by raising its price.
For a given ω,t h i si m p l i e st h a tm o r er e s o u r c e sa r ea v a i l a b l ef o rR & Da n dt h e r e f o r et h e
(LMC)-curve shifts to the right as well. Thus, the model predicts that higher price setting
power (less competition) unambiguously raises h∗ and thereby increases the economy’s
growth rate in long-run equilibrium, gy. Like the scale eﬀect prediction, this result is
hard to reconcile with empirical evidence and modiﬁed in the next subsection.
Finally, an increase in R&D productivity, λ,d o e sn o ta ﬀect the (LMC)-curve but,
provided r>0, shifts the (FOC)-curve to the right, resulting in an increase of both ω∗
and h∗. The reason for this is as follows. On the one hand, a higher λ raises, in the state
after t innovations, the probability µt to replace the current intermediate good producer
by innovation t +1 . On the other hand, however, it raises the probability for innovator
t +1to be replaced itself. There are thus two opposing eﬀects on the marginal beneﬁt
to conduct R&D. If r>0, the former dominates the latter. (If r =0 ,b o t he ﬀects cancel
each other and the (FOC)-curve remains unaﬀected.) Together with a direct impact (for
given R&D input) of a higher λ on steady state growth, this implies that gy is increasing
in λ.
3.1.3 Steady state equilibrium wages and inequality
It is also interesting to look more closely to the eﬀects on wage rates for skilled and
unskilled labor, adjusted for productivity. Combining (48) and (49), we ﬁnd that the










37Moreover, from (42), the wage rate for unskilled labor, q,i sg i v e nb yqt = ∂yt/∂L =
(1−α)Atxα
t after t innovations (recall L =1 ). Deﬁne ζt ≡ qt/At. Then, in steady state,
using x∗ =[ α/(χω∗)]
1
1−α and ω∗ as given by (51), we have
ζ






We have already seen above that an increase in the skilled labor force, H,l o w e r sω∗,
whereas, if r>0, an increase in R&D productivity, λ, raises ω∗. The opposite eﬀects
hold regarding the productivity adjusted steady state wage for unskilled labor, ζ
∗.T h i s
is because an increase in ω∗ lowers the equilibrium input of the intermediate good, which
is complementary to unskilled labor in the production of the ﬁnal good. Thus, ζ
∗ rises
in H and, if r>0, decreases in λ. Finally, from Fig. 5, it is evident that there are
opposing eﬀects regarding the impact of a higher mark-up factor, χ,o nω∗. Indeed, the
net eﬀect is ambiguous, according to (51). In contrast, due to the negative eﬀect of a
higher χ on demand for the intermediate good and the technological complementarity
between x and L in producing the ﬁnal good, ζ
∗ is decreasing in χ.






γ − (γ − 1)/χ
H + r/λ
,
according to (51) and (52), and thus is increasing in χ (recall γ>1). Higher market
power of intermediate goods producers therefore not only raises the economy’s growth
rate on average, but also raises wage inequality.
3.2 Competition and R&D
This subsection modiﬁes the prediction of many models of endogenous technical change
that higher price setting power of intermediate good ﬁrms, which produce a capital input
on basis of a “design” or “blueprint” created by innovators, unambiguously fosters R&D
activity. Employing panel data from British ﬁrms, Blundell, Griﬃth and van Reenen
(1999) ﬁnd that industries with lower import penetration and higher concentration levels
38generate fewer aggregate innovations. This refutes the hypothesis of the previously
discussed creative-destruction model, among others, that a higher mark-up factor χ in
the intermediate good sector spurs innovative eﬀort.
At the same time, there is a large body of evidence for the famous hypothesis of
Joseph A. Schumpeter that larger ﬁr m sa r em o r el i k e l yt oi n n o v a t e :“ A ss o o na sw eg o
into details and inquire into the individual items in which progress was most conspicuous,
the trail leads [...] precisely to the doors of the large concerns - [...] - and a shocking
suspicion dawns upon us that big business may have had more to do with creating that
standard of life than with keeping it down” (Schumpeter, 1942; reprinted 1994, p. 83).
In addition to their evidence on the relationship between innovations and the intensity of
product market competition across industries, Blundell, Griﬃth and van Reenen (1999)
ﬁnd that within industries ﬁrms with high market share are the most innovative ones.
Also other studies strongly suggest that ﬁrm size and R&D expenditure are strongly
positively related (see e.g. Cohen and Levin, 1989, and Cohen and Klepper, 1996a,b,
as well as the references therein). As stated in Cohen and Klepper (1996a, p. 929)
“[...] in most industries, it has not been possible to reject the null hypothesis that R&D
varies proportionally with size across the entire ﬁrm size distribution”. For instance,
81.6 percent of business R&D expenditure in the U.S. in 1997 have been incurred by
ﬁrms with more than 1000 employees (OECD, 1999, Tab. 5.4.1).
However, earlier models of endogenous technical change, by suggesting that higher
intensity of competition harms innovations, cannot explain why large ﬁrms can be the
main innovators in an industry and at the same time increased competition can spur
innovations. We will now present a growth model with heterogeneous ﬁrms which cap-
tures this possibility, and thereby is consistent with the discussed empirical ﬁndings. It
shows that incumbent ﬁrms who are technologically advanced and therefore face high
demand for their products raise their R&D eﬀort in response to increased competition.
In the remainder of this section, we heavily draw on Aghion and Howitt (2005, section
4). Their model has diﬀerentiated implications for regulatory policy. For instance, it
allows us to conclude in which kind of industries domestic governments should foster or
curb competition from foreign ﬁrms.
393.2.1 The model
Consider a small open economy in which R&D is adaptive in the sense that ﬁrms have
to innovate in order to stay at or prevent falling more behind the technological frontier.
Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their distance to the frontier technology, which
evolves exogenously. Again, innovations occur with uncertainty, where the probability of
successfully innovating depends on R&D eﬀort. For simplicity, the interest rate is zero
(r =0 ).
Suppose there is one type of labor, where the workforce L is normalized to unity.
Again, workers inelastically supply their labor to a perfect labor market. Labor is used
exclusively for the production of a homogenous ﬁnal good. The ﬁnal good can not
only be consumed, but can also be used as input for both the R&D process and the
production of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. The ﬁnal good (again, the numeraire)









0 <α<1,w h e r ext(i) denotes the quantity of intermediate input i ∈ [0,1] in period t
and At(i) indicates the quality of the most recent version of that input. Lt is labor input
in t.
The technological frontier ¯ At evolves according to
¯ At = γ ¯ At−1,γ> 1. (54)
There are three types of sectors, indexed by 0, 1, 2,a n do n eﬁrm in each sector
(the incumbent). An incumbent i of type 0 is at the technological frontier and has to
successfully innovate to stay there. A ﬁrm of type 0 thus produces in t−1 an intermediate





¯ At with probability µ0,
¯ At−1 with probability 1 − µ0.
(55)
40To innovate with probability µ0 in t−1 requires R&D expenditure (in terms of the ﬁnal
good) of
Nt−1(i)=0 .5(µ0)
2 ¯ At. (56)
That is, to raise the probability of a successful innovation becomes increasingly expensive.
Moreover, the required R&D spending rises with the targeted quality, ¯ At.
As e c t o ri of type 1 is one step behind the current technological frontier. That is, in





¯ At−1 with probability µ1,
¯ At−2 with probability 1 − µ1,
(57)
where success probability µ1 requires R&D expenditure of
Nt−1(i)=0 .5(µ1)
2 ¯ At−1. (58)
Finally, in a type 2 sector, quality in t−1 equals ¯ At−3,i . e . ,aﬁrm in this sector is two
steps behind the frontier. For simplicity, to prevent those ﬁr m st of a l lm o r et h a nt w o
steps behind, suppose that in period t,aﬁrm i in a type 2 sector either automatically
upgrades one step to At(i)= ¯ At−2 or even catches up with the technological frontier,
without any R&D eﬀort. That is, type 2 ﬁrms will not spend anything on R&D. There
is a constant fraction ε of type 2 ﬁrms which in t obtain ¯ At without innovating, by
“luck”. Otherwise, all ﬁrms would become type 2 ﬁrms in the long run, as type 1 ﬁrms,
which are not successful in their attempt to innovate, become type 2 ﬁrms and, similarly,
unsuccessful type 0 ﬁrms become type 1 ﬁrms. This is because the technological frontier
g r o w so v e rt i m e( a tc o n s t a n tr a t e ,γ − 1).
Again suppose there is a large number of potential competitors of the incumbent in
each sector (“competitive fringe”), where the incumbent is more cost-eﬃcient than the
competitive fringe. Whereas the incumbent can transform one unit of the ﬁnal good
into one unit of the intermediate input (i.e., marginal costs are unity), marginal costs of
the competitive fringe are given by χ ∈ (1,1/α). In contrast to the previously discussed
41creative-destruction model, however, the competitive fringe may not be able to perfectly
imitate the quality oﬀered by an incumbent. More precisely, assume that the fringe ﬁrms
can produce intermediate good in sector i with quality min{At(i), ¯ At−1}.T h a ti s ,i na
type 0 sector, the quality which the competitive fringe can oﬀer in t is ¯ At−1.T h i sm e a n s
that a fringe ﬁrm can imitate only non-innovating ﬁrms, i.e., an incumbent which was
of type 0 and then turns into type 1, but not a successful innovator. In contrast, if the
incumbent in a type 1 sector innovates, the competitive fringe is able to imitate even a
successful innovator in a type 1 sector, i.e., again has quality ¯ At−1. Otherwise, quality
of a fringe ﬁrm is ¯ At−2, either by imitating an unsuccessful incumbent which was of type
1 before failing to innovate or by imitating an incumbent ﬁrm which was of type 2 to
begin with and was not lucky enough to upgrade its quality.
3.2.2 Equilibrium analysis
A c c o r d i n gt o( 5 3 )a n dLt = L =1 , the inverse demand function for input i in t is
pt(i)=α(At(i)/xt(i))
1−α. In type 1 and type 2 sectors, as the competitive fringe has
quality which is equal to that of the incumbent, incumbents in these sectors set prices
equal to the marginal costs of the competitive fringe. Thus, pt(i)=χ<1/α.
Hence, in a type 2 ﬁrm, xt(i)=( α/χ)
1
1−α ¯ At−2 and thus proﬁts, πt(i)=( pt(i)−1)xt(i),
become
πt(i)=( χ − 1)(α/χ)
1
1−α ¯ At−2 ≡ ˜ π(χ) ¯ At−2. (59)





˜ π(χ) ¯ At−1 with probability µ1,
˜ π(χ) ¯ At−2 with probability 1 − µ1.
(60)
Note that ˜ π(χ) is increasing in χ,a sχ<1/α.
We now analyze the R&D decision of type 1 incumbents, who solve:
max
µ1
{µ1˜ π(χ) ¯ At−1 +( 1− µ1)˜ π(χ) ¯ At−2 − 0.5(µ1)
2 ¯ At−1}, (61)
42according to (58) and (60). The ﬁrst-order condition reads ˜ π(χ)( ¯ At−1− ¯ At−2)−µ1 ¯ At−1 =







˜ π(χ),( 6 2 )
which is increasing in χ. Hence, for incumbents of type 1, a higher intensity of product
market competition reduces R&D incentives. The reason is that the diﬀerence between
post-innovation and pre-innovation proﬁts, ˜ π(χ)( ¯ At−1 − ¯ At−2),i si n c r e a s i n gi nχ.I n
other words, the proﬁt gain from successfully innovating declines if competitive pres-
sure from fringe ﬁrms rises, in turn lowering R&D incentives. In line with Aghion and
H o w i t t( 2 0 0 5 ) ,w em a yl a b e lt h i sa s“ S c h u m p e t e r i a ne ﬀect”, although this term is rather
misleading: As outlined above, Schumpeter (1942) merely suggested that larger ﬁrms
conduct more R&D, which may well be the case although more intense competition may
lead to higher overall R&D spending, as will become apparent.
L e tu sn o wc o n t r a s tt h er e s u l tf o rt y p e1ﬁrms with the R&D decision of incumbents
o ft y p e0 . I ft h e r ei sn oi n n o v a t i o n ,t h ef r i n g eﬁrms can oﬀer the same quality as the
incumbent. Thus, an unsuccessful type 0 incumbent again sets pt(i)=χ.H o w e v e r ,i f
there is an innovation, potential rivals not only have higher marginal costs, χ>1,b u t
also lower quality, ¯ At−1 < ¯ At = At(i), than a successful innovator i in a type 0 sector.
Under assumption
αχγ
1−α > 1 (63)
a successful innovator can then set monopoly price pt(i)=1 /α and thus produces xt(i)=
α
2
1−α ¯ At, leading to proﬁts πt(i)=˜ π(1/α) ¯ At. To see this, note that the inverse demand
function faced by all ﬁrms implies pt(i)/At(i)1−α = α/xt(i)
1−α.T h e ﬁnal goods sector
thus prefers the combination of price pt(i)=1 /α and quality At(i)= ¯ At = γ ¯ At−1 of
the successful innovator to the combination pt(i)=χ and At(i)= ¯ At−1 oﬀered by the
competitive fringe, if (1/α)/(γ ¯ At−1)1−α <χ / ( ¯ At−1)1−α, which implies assumption (63).





˜ π(1/α) ¯ At with probability µ0,
˜ π(χ) ¯ At−1 with probability 1 − µ0.
(64)








The ﬁrst-order condition reads ˜ π(1/α) ¯ At−˜ π(χ) ¯ At−1−µ0 ¯ At =0 .T h u s ,u s i n g¯ At = γ ¯ At−1,
we obtain




which is decreasing in mark-up factor χ. Hence, for incumbents of type 0, a higher
intensity of product market competition raises R&D incentives, in contrast to what we
found for a type 1 sector. The reason is that the diﬀerence between post-innovation
and pre-innovation proﬁts, ˜ π(1/α) ¯ At − ˜ π(χ) ¯ At−1, is now decreasing in χ. T h i si sb e -
cause pre-innovation rents are rising in the price setting power of incumbents, whereas
a successful innovator is technologically so advanced that competition of potential rivals
can be disregarded while setting prices. In this sense, an innovator of type 0 can escape
competition. The eﬀect that higher intensity of competition spurs R&D incentives may
thus be called “escape-competition” eﬀect.
In sum, the analysis suggests that in sectors close to the “technology frontier”, higher
intensity of competition fosters R&D spending (∂µ0/∂χ < 0), whereas for sectors more
distant to the frontier, competition is harmful (∂µ1/∂χ > 0). Also note that, as ˜ π(1/α) >
˜ π(χ),w eh a v eµ0 >µ 1, according to (62) and (66). Thus, ﬁrms close to the frontier spend
more on R&D. Using assumption (63), it is easy to see that successful innovators of type
0a l s os e l lm o r eo u t p u tt h a nt y p e1ﬁrms, despite higher prices, as their products are of
suﬃciently higher quality. Thus, the results are consistent with the evidence that larger
ﬁrms spend more on R&D than smaller ﬁrms.
What is the implication of the coexistence of the escape-competition eﬀect on R&D
44eﬀort of technologically advanced sectors on the one hand and the Schumpeter eﬀect
on R&D of the more backward ﬁrms on the other hand for aggregate innovation eﬀort?
To answer this question, we have to know the equilibrium shares of type 0 and type 1
sectors in the economy, denoted by q0 and q1, respectively. (Recall that type 2 ﬁrms do
not incur R&D costs.)
In steady state, using that a share ε of type 2 sectors exogenously catches up with
the technological frontier, q0 and q1 a r eg i v e nb yt h ee q u a t i o n s
(1 − q0 − q1)ε
| {z }
entry in sector 0
= q0(1 − µ0)
| {z }




entry in sector 1
= q1(1 − µ1)
| {z }
exit from sector 1
. (68)
Solving this equation system, by using the expressions for µ1 and µ0 as given by (62) and
(66), respectively, gives us the aggregate innovation rate I = q0µ0+q1µ1 as a function of χ.
Generally, this function can be increasing (Schumpeterian eﬀect dominates), decreasing
(escape-competition eﬀect dominates) or non-monotonic.
A decreasing shape (higher degree of competition spurs innovation) would be con-
sistent with the evidence by Blundell, Griﬃth and van Reenen (1999). In a series of
papers, Aghion and coauthors ﬁnd a non-monotonic, U-shaped relationship between the
competitive pressure on British ﬁrms from foreign companies and the average innovation
rate. Obviously, given the two opposing forces from ﬁrms close and more distant to
the frontier, the selection of ﬁrms within a sample matters for the observed relationship
between competition and average innovation.
454 R&D-based Growth with Horizontal and Vertical
Diﬀerentiation
In this section we present a version of the model by Young (1998) which is representative
for a class of models featuring both horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation of products.37
It is particularly designed to remove scale eﬀects with respect to the economy’s growth
rate. Unlike semi-endogenous growth models, it is capable to generate positive long-run
growth without scale eﬀects in growth rates even in absence of population growth. We
also present a simple extension of the model which introduces credit market imperfections
i nt h es p i r i to far e c e n tp a p e rb yA g h i o n ,H o w i t ta n dM a y e r - F o u l k e s( 2 0 0 5 ) .W es h o w
h o wt h ee c o n o m y ’ sr a t eo fg r o w t hd e p e n d so nt h ed e g r e eo fﬁnancial development. In
particular, we argue that there can be divergence between developed and less developed
countries, i.e., poorer economies grow slower than richer economies.
4.1 The Young model
4.1.1 Set up
Consider an economy which is populated by L identical individuals with inﬁnite lifetimes,
each supplying one unit of labor in each period t =0 ,1,2,...(i.e., there is no population
g r o w t h ) .T h el a b o rm a r k e ti sp e r f e c ta n dt h ew a g er a t ei sn o r m a l i z e dt ou n i t y ,wt =1 .





















37See also Peretto (1998), Segerstrom (1998) and Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) for models that
capture similar ideas. Illuminating discussions of this class of models can be found in Jones (1999) and
Lainez and Peretto (2006).
46σ>1,w h e r ext(i) denotes the quantity of variety i ∈ [0,n t] consumed in period t,a n d
At(i) indicates its quality.
Each ﬁrm produces one variety of the horizontally diﬀerentiated product in monop-
olistic competition. The measure nt is referred to as the number of ﬁr m sa n dg o o d si n
t and is endogenously determined for t ≥ 1. One unit of labor can be transformed into
one unit of output of each variety, i.e., marginal production costs equal the wage rate
and therefore are unity.
Following Young (1998), ﬁrms can incur in-house R&D labor investments in order
to improve product quality one period in advance of production. Denote by lt−1(i) the
amount of R&D employed by ﬁrm i ∈ [0,n t] in t − 1.P r o d u c tq u a l i t yAt(i) of variety i
in any period t ≥ 1 evolves according to
At(i)= ¯ At−1z(lt−1(i)), (71)




the average product quality level in t − 1,r e ﬂecting the state of technology in t − 1.
¯ A0 > 0 is given. According to (71), knowledge acquired by R&D activity is private
information of a ﬁrm (e.g., due to intellectual property rights) for one period only. This
is for simplicity. Moreover, if all ﬁrms invest the same amount in R&D, the number of
ﬁrms does not matter for research capabilities of ﬁrms in the subsequent period. This
assumption reﬂects the notion of Young (1998) that innovations of ﬁrms are ‘equivalent’
in the sense that ﬁrms come up with similar solutions to similar problems at the same
time. It contributes to the removal of scale eﬀects in growth rates.
T h e r ei sf r e ee n t r yo fﬁrms into the economy, with a large number of potential en-
trants. Firms may have to incur a ﬁxed labor requirement f ≥ 0 prior to production,
which may be thought of being related to red tape or the organization of production.
In t − 1,e a c hﬁrm i producing ﬁnal output in period t issues bonds or shares in order
to ﬁnance ﬁxed costs f as well as R&D investment. The ﬁnancial market is perfect (an
assumption which is relaxed below).
474.1.2 Equilibrium analysis
Let us start with the static utility maximization. According to (70), for a given aggregate














is a price index. This implies Ct = Et/Pt, i.e., Ct equals “real” consumption. Next
consider intertemporal maximization of utility (69) subject to at+1 =( 1+rt)at +L−Et
(recall wt =1 ), t ≥ 0,w h e r eat denotes asset holding in t and rt denotes the interest
rate in t (a0 and r0 are given). Using lnCt =l nEt − lnPt, for all t ≥ 1,w eﬁnd that
consumption spending evolves according to the Euler equation
Et =( 1+rt)ρEt−1. (74)
Proﬁts of ﬁrm i in period t are given by πt(i)=( pt(i) −1)xt(i). Using (72), optimal
prices are thus given by pt(i)=σ/(σ − 1) ≡ p∗ for all i and t.A tt i m et − 1,e a c hﬁrm
i ∈ [0,n t] chooses R&D labor investments lt−1(i) to maximize its ﬁrm value πt(i)/(1 +
rt)−lt−1(i)−f. Using (71)-(73) together with pt(i)=p∗ = σ/(σ −1), the optimization










− lt−1(i) − f
)
. (75)




0(l) →∞and (σ − 2)z
0(l)/z(l)+z
00(l)/z
0(l) < 0 for all l>0. (76)
The latter condition in (76) ensures that the second-order condition for a maximum is
48fulﬁlled. (It holds, for instance, if σ ≤ 2 and z00 < 0.) Under assumption (76), there is
a symmetric choice of lt−1 and thus At(i)= ¯ At = ¯ At−1z(lt−1) for all i.T h e ﬁrst-order







Free entry implies that in equilibrium the ﬁrm value is zero. Thus, under symmetry,
Et/σ
1+rt
= nt(lt−1 + f), (78)
according to (71) and (75). Combining (77) and (78), we ﬁnd that equilibrium R&D





∗ + f)=1 . (79)
The latter condition in assumption (76) implies that the left-hand side of (79) is strictly
decreasing in l∗. Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium R&D investment level l∗ > 0.
The equilibrium growth rate of product quality, g ¯ A,i sg i v e nb yg ¯ A = z(l∗) − 1,
according to (71). Clearly, there are no transitional dynamics in this model. Moreover, as
will become apparent, g ¯ A is also the growth rate of “real consumption level”, Ct = Et/Pt.
As an important result, as l∗ is independent of population size L, there is no scale eﬀect
in the equilibrium rate of growth of product quality, g ¯ A.
The absence of scale eﬀects in growth rates is driven by two properties: First, the
number of ﬁrms in t, nt does not matter for the state of technology in t, ¯ At,i ns y m m e t r i c
equilibrium. Second, n turns out to be proportional to L in equilibrium and therefore
leaves R&D investment per ﬁrm unaﬀected. To see the latter, combine (74) and (78) to
ﬁnd that nt(lt−1+f)=ρEt−1/σ. Also note that consumption expenditure Et = ntp∗xt in
symmetric equilibrium and therefore nt−1xt−1 =( σ − 1)Et−1/σ. Thus, full employment






49for nominal equilibrium expenditure. Consequently, according to (74), the equilibrium
interest rate is given by rt = r∗ =( 1−ρ)/ρ for all t ≥ 1. More importantly, substituting








Thus, the number of ﬁrms is proportional to population size L. This result is consistent
with evidence recently provided by Lainez and Peretto (2006).
Despite the absence of scale eﬀects in growth rates, and in contrast to the semi-
endogenous growth model by Jones (1995), the model allows for positive long-run (ex-
ponential) growth even without population growth. This also means that the long-run
growth rate does generally not respond to public policy like R&D subsidies.38
4.1.3 Scale eﬀect in levels




σ−1 ¯ At(σ − 1)/σ. Thus, using (80), real consumption per capita in
equilibrium, c∗
t = C∗









σ−1 ¯ At. (82)
Hence, the growth rate of real consumption per capita, gc,e q u a l sg ¯ A = z(l∗) − 1.H o w -
ever, although there are no scale eﬀects in growth rates,t h e r ea r es c a l ee ﬀects in per
capita levels, like in other growth models “without” scale eﬀects (e.g. Dinopoulos and
Thompson, 1998; Jones, 1995a,b; Peretto, 1998, Segerstrom, 1998). Clearly, according
to (82), as the equilibrium number of ﬁrms, n∗,i si n c r e a s i n gi nL,s oi sc∗
t. For instance,
market integration between two economies of equal size L would double the number of
available products in each economy, thereby raising c∗
t and thus increasing per capita
utility. This is due to the property that an utility index of the Dixit-Stiglitz type like
38One can show that R&D subsidies are ineﬀective to raise growth rates in this model only in the
special case when there are no ﬁxed costs, f =0(Grossmann, 2007a), which is the case exclusively
considered in the original model by Young (1998).
50(70) captures “love-of-variety”.39 It is analogous to the specialization gains captured by
the production function for ﬁnal goods in models of horizontal innovations (e.g. Romer,
1990).40
We conclude the discussion of the Young-model by noting that, according to (79)
and (81), higher ﬁxed costs f are associated with a higher R&D investment per ﬁrm,
l∗,a n dl a r g e rﬁrm size, L/n∗, in equilibrium. That is, larger ﬁrms invest more in R&D.
Grossmann (2007a) argues that for this reason, endogenous advertising expenditure, even
if combative in nature, are associated with higher R&D spending per ﬁrm and thereby
may foster economic growth.
4.2 Financial development and growth
We now attempt to capture in a simple way some insights by Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-
Foulkes (2005) on the link between ﬁnancial development and R&D-based growth. For
this purpose, suppose that, rather than being able to borrow freely, potential ﬁrms can
invest at most an amount η ¯ At−1 at time t−1 for setting up a ﬁrm and for R&D, where
η>0. Thus, as the economy grows, the investment limit relaxes. Parameter η captures
the stage of ﬁnancial development relative to the stage of economic development, the
latter being measured by ¯ At−1.T h u s , η may be viewed as reﬂecting the quality of
ﬁnancial institutions.
Clearly, if η ¯ At−1 <l ∗ + f, the borrowing constraint is binding and each ﬁrm invests
lt−1 = η ¯ At−1−f in R&D. Thus, ¯ At/ ¯ At−1 = z(η ¯ At−1−f) <z (l∗). Moreover, analogously
to the derivation of (81), we ﬁnd that employment per ﬁrm in t is given by L/nt =
η ¯ At−1(σ − 1+ρ)/ρ. Thus, compared to the case without credit constraints, there are
more and smaller ﬁrms and the growth rate, gc = g ¯ A, is lower. As the economy develops,
for any given η, both the rate of economic growth and the size of ﬁrms increase over time.
Moreover, as long as ﬁrms are credit-constrained, for any stage of economic development
¯ At−1, both the rate of economic growth (g ¯ A)a n dt h es i z eo fﬁrms (L/nt)i n c r e a s ew i t h
39According to (70), in symmetric equilibrium, Ct = n
1
σ−1
t (ntxt) ¯ At. Thus, for a given total amount
of goods, ntxt, utility index Ct increases with the number of available varieties, nt.
40For further discussion on scale eﬀects in levels versus growth rates, see e.g. Dinopoulos and Thomp-
son (1998) and Jones (1999).
51the quality of ﬁnancial institutions, η. If an economy becomes suﬃciently rich, the
investment limit does not matter anymore for economic growth (and the growth rate
again becomes z(l∗)−1). These predictions are well in line with empirical evidence (see
Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005).
In sum, the extended model with credit constraints predicts that economies which
have weak ﬁnancial institutions (captured by a low η) and/or are poor economically
(captured by a low ¯ At−1) grow slower than more developed economies. This relates the
observation of economic divergence between rich and poor countries (see Fig. 2) to the
quality of ﬁnancial institutions.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Understanding R&D incentives of ﬁrms is crucial for explaining long-run growth and
designing public policy which is conducive for economic development. In this survey, we
have focused on the model structure of seminal contributions in the theory of endogenous
growth and discussed some important issues and applications.
Most notably, we presented the structure of the horizontal innovation model by Romer
(1990), the vertical innovation model by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and, representative
for frameworks in which goods are both horizontally and vertically diﬀerentiated, the
model by Young (1998). We have focused on issues like the scale eﬀect (e.g. Jones,
1995a,b, 1999), directed technological change (e.g. Acemoglu, 1998, 2002), appropriate
technology with an innovating North and an imitating South (Acemoglu and Zilibotti,
2001), trade and growth (e.g. Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991), competition and R&D
(e.g. Blundell, Griﬃth and van Reenen, 1999; Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth and
Howitt, 2005, Aghion, Blundell, Griﬃth, Howitt and Prantl, 2006), and the role of
imperfect capital markets for R&D-based growth (Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes,
2005).
The issues we treated should be taken as an illustration of the usefulness of R&D-
based growth theory, as the list of important applications is far from being exhaustive.
For instance, recent developments in the theory of endogenous technical change which we
52have left out due to space constraints include the role for R&D-based growth of the in-
come distribution (e.g. Zweimüller, 2000; Föllmi and Zweimüller, 2006), macroeconomic
volatility (e.g. Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova, 2005), and domestic savings
(e.g. Aghion, Comin and Howitt, 2006). Finally, it is evident from our analysis that
both the stock of human capital and the protection of intellectual property rights are
important for growth. Thus, it is intriguing to endogenize both human capital forma-
tion (e.g. Eicher, 1995, Grossmann, 2007b) and intellectual property rights institutions
(Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa, 2006) in a R&D-based growth framework.
6 Appendix
6.1 Directed technical change









H.( 8 4 )
Plugging the demand for machines xL and xH ((15) and (16)) into (83) and (84) and





















































where θ := 1 + (ε − 1)(1 − α).
From (17) and (18) the proﬁto ft h et y p i c a lxH-monopolist relative to the proﬁto f































































This is equ. (20) in the main text.






















































This is equ. (23) in the main text.
Derivation of equ. (22). Next we substitute
AH












Proﬁts in the market for designs directed to unskilled labor, where the price of designs
54is denoted by PAL,a r eg i v e nb yPALηRL −RL (using ˙ AL = ηRL). Using that proﬁts are























.( 8 9 )
At next we determine the equilibrium solution for pL. This then yields the equilibrium
solution for r, and, when combined with the KRR, gives the equilibrium long run growth




L +( 1− γ)
εp
1−ε











































This is equ. (22) in the main text.
6.2 Appropriate technology
Intermediate goods prices p(i). The labor market is perfectly competitive and hence
labor earns its marginal product. Moreover, the wage rate for each type of labor (l and
h)m u s tb et h es a m ea c r o s sd i ﬀerent sectors. By noting (29) this gives
wL =( 1− α)p(i)
1
1−αAL(1 − i), (93)
wH =( 1− α)p(i)
1
1−αAHi.( 9 4 )
55Dividing (93) and (94) by wL =( 1−α)p(0)
1











=⇒ p(i)=p(0)(1 − i)









−(1−α) ∀ J<i≤ 1. (96)
Equilibrium employment.F r o m p(i)y(i)=p(0)y(0) = p(1)y(1) (resulting from













∀ J<i≤ 1. (98)
The threshold sector (equ. (34)). In the threshold sector i = J it must be the













































This is equ. (34) in the main text.








































¢1−α together with the preceding equation to determine p(0) and
p(1) ﬁnally leads to
p(0) = exp(α − 1)J
α−1, (101)
p(1) = exp(α − 1)(1 − J)
α−1. (102)
Aggregate production (equ. (35)). Using Y =
R 1
0 p(i)y(i)di and noting (29),






1−α [AL(1 − i)l(i)+AHih(i)]di
























Substituting p(0) and p(1) according to (101) and (102) and simplifying yields







This is equ. (35) in the main text.
The factor bias
AH
AL (equ. (36)). Substituting prices in (30) and (31) according
to (95) and (96) gives






1−α (1 − i)l(i)di =( 1− α)αp(0)
1
1−αL, (103)











AL = const. requires πL = πH (both sectors have the same
R&D technology, i.e. it takes the same number of units of ﬁnal output to ﬁnd a new

































This is equ. (36) in the main text.
586.3 Trade and growth
The interest rate in the lab-equipment model (equ. (39)). As has been noted
above, the lab-equipment model is basically a one sector model where total output can
be viewed to be produced by a single sector









Each representative ﬁrm in this sector chooses the demand for x(i) so as to maximize









r .T h eﬁrst-order condition of this maximization problem is
α2L1−αxα−1
r
− 1=0 , (106)
which, by noting (105), implies px = r
α (which is, of course, the same result as for the
case of suppliers choosing an optimal supply price). Moreover, under free entry the
equilibrium price of a design must satisfy pA = max
x {
pxx
r − x}. Substituting px on the









Now since pA = 1
B (lab-equipment approach), one can determine the equilibrium
















This is equ. (39) in the main text.


































Now since the equilibrium amount of xint is independent of the size of the market
(see (107)), it remains constant. Thus the preceding equation immediately shows that
for pA to remain constant, the interest rate must increase by a factor 21−α.
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